State Prohibitions on Employment Opportunities for Resident Aliens: Legislative Recommendations by Peltz, Joy B.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 10 | Number 4 Article 6
1982
State Prohibitions on Employment Opportunities
for Resident Aliens: Legislative Recommendations
Joy B. Peltz
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joy B. Peltz, State Prohibitions on Employment Opportunities for Resident Aliens: Legislative Recommendations , 10 Fordham Urb. L.J. 699
(1982).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol10/iss4/6
STATE PROHIBITIONS ON EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESIDENT ALIENS:
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Introduction
Aliens' come to the United States from all over the world2 possess-
ing myriad talents, skills and educational backgrounds. Prior to ob-
taining permanent resident alien status, however, these immigrants
must undergo the screening processes of the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service 3 and meet rigid standards as to health, education,
character, adaptability and employability. 4 Once admitted, resident
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1101a (3) (1976), defines "alien" as "any person not a citizen or
national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § ll01a (20) (1976), defines "lawfully
admitted for permanent residence" as "the status of having been lawfully accorded
the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accord-
ance with the immigration laws, such status not having been changed." For the
purposes of this Note, which does not address illegal or nonresident aliens, the terms
"'alien," "permanent resident alien" and "resident alien" shall be used interchange-
ably.
2. In 1981 approximately 697,000 immigrants and refugees entered the United
States. In the past five years nearly 3 million immigrants and refugees arrived in the
United States. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND R-o'ucE POLICY, UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 93
(Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMMISSION REPORT]. More than
half of those individuals emigrated form Mexico, Korea, China, Taiwan, Vietnam,
India, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines and the United Kingdom. Id.
at 415.
3. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), created and established by
Congress in 1940, is a part of the Department of Justice. 8 U.S.C. § 1551 (1976).
4. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941). The immigration system evolved
significantly in the last thirty years. Today there are four categories of prospective
immigrants-those who virtually are unrestricted as to the numbers which may
enter, those who are given preference for entry, those who are subject to quotas, and
those who are ineligible to enter. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), enumer-
ates 33 categories where prospective immigrants shall be excluded from admission to
the United States. Section 1182 provides, in pertinent part, "[a]liens who are pau-
pers, professional beggars, or vagrants" will not be permitted to enter the United
States. Id. § 1182(8). "Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of
performing skilled or unskilled labor [are prohibited], unless the Secretary of Labor
has determined . . . that (A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing,
qualified (or equally qualified in the case of aliens who are members of the teaching
profession or who have exceptional ability in the sciences or arts), and available at
the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States at the place
where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor and (B) the employment
of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the
workers in the United States similarly employed." Id. § 1182 (14). In addition
"[a]liens who . . . are likely at any time to become public charges" will be excluded.
Id. § 1182 (16).
699
700 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL Vol. X
aliens enjoy several important privileges: they may remain in the
United States indefinitely; they may establish permanent residence in
this country; and they may work here.5  Nevertheless, significant job
opportunities are foreclosed to aliens by states6 which require United
States citizenship as a prerequisite to eligibility for public employ-
ment 7 and professional or occupational licenses. These states argue
that employees must be knowledgeable with and sympathetic to
American laws, customs and ideals.8 Another proffered rationale is a
desire to preserve jobs for citizens.9
At a time of increasing emphasis on federalism and states' rights the
state public employment sector is an important and attractive source
of jobs for both citizens and aliens.' 0 State legislators face mounting
pressure to restrict the availability of state licenses and employment
opportunities to United States citizens because of recession, inflation,
severe unemployment" and the influx of refugees.' 2
5. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 72 (1974).
6. This Note does not deal with federal discrimination against aliens. See Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1975); Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. 13
(1981); cf. Note, Aliens in the Federal Civil Service, 10 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 255
(1977) (urges limited federal employment restrictions); and Comment, Aliens' Right
to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 835, 848-57 (1977)
(discussing federal employment discrimination against aliens).
7. Employment discrimination based on alienage in the private sector is not
discussed. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that no cause
of action exists under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (1970)), for discrimination against
aliens by private employers).
8. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 733 (1973) (Burger, J., dissenting).
9. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (citing Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (rejecting the fiscal integrity justification for discrimi-
nating against aliens).
10. See, e.g., U.S. May Shrink 'New Federalism' IJ State Talks Fail, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 8, 1982, at 16, col. 2.
11. In the SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, the committee discussed the
necessary goal of balancing open doors with protectionism. SELECT COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 and 103. In his foreward to the SELECT COMMISSION
REPORT, Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh asserted that immigrants create as well as take
jobs and readily pay more into public coffers than they take out. Id. at 9. It also has
been argued that employment competition between aliens and citizens is limited.
One author averred that skilled aliens fill the "lower ranks of high level ocupations
where qualified Americans are reluctant to stay." Reubens, Aliens, lobs and Immi-
gration Policy, 3 IMMIGRATION L. REV. 649, 653 (1979-80). As an illustration of his
theory, Reubens pointed to the large percentage of alien physicians on public hospital
staffs. Id.
12. Since 1979 increased refugee flows included over 160,000 Indochinese and
over 30,000 Soviet Jews annually. Additionally, in 1980 more than 130,000 Cuban
and Haitian "boat people" entered the United States. SELECT COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 415.
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
The constitutionality of citizenship requirements frequently has
been challenged on equal protection grounds 1 3 but the results have not
been clear or consistent. In a recent Supreme Court decision, Cabell
v. Chavez-Salido,14 the Court, by upholding the constitutionality of a
California statute which restricted a deputy probation officer position
to United States citizens, virtually granted the states free rein to
promulgate statutory citizenship requirements.15 If state legislatures
enact restrictive legislation, however, the harm will be two-fold.
First, the state's citizens will be denied the skills and talents offered by
aliens. Second, aliens who pay taxes, serve in the armed forces and
contribute to the community will be unfairly denied public employ-
ment.
This Note discusses the constitutional protections afforded resident
aliens seeking public employment and occupational or professional
licenses as articulated by the United States Supreme Court. The inter-
pretation of these Supreme Court decisions by lower federal and state
courts are analyzed and representative state statutory schemes are
examined. In conclusion, this Note offers recommendations for an
equitable resolution of the conflict between legitimate state goals and
the resident alien's right to employment opportunity. Concrete guide-
lines based upon coherent policies are needed in order to prevent
discrimination against resident aliens.
II. Supreme Court Cases
Resident aliens, like citizens, are entitled to equal protection under
the law 16 and, therefore, state legislation which discriminates against
aliens is subject to challenge under the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. Traditional equal protection analysis con-
sists of two standards of review: 17 rational basis and strict judicial
scrutiny.' The rational basis test, wherein the challenged statute
13. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 50 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982); Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
14. 50 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982). Two resident aliens challenged a Califor-
nia statute which required citizenship for employment as a deputy probation officer.
15. Id. at 4099. The Court held that California had a rational basis for the statute.
16. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (aliens are "persons" within the
ambit of the fourteenth amendment).
17. The fourteenth amendment provides "That no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating a statute
denying commercial fishing licenses to aliens ineligible to become naturalized); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (struck down a statute which discriminatorily
precluded Chinese persons from operating laundries).
18. Commentators have proposed an intermediate standard of review. See Gun-
ther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer
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must be shown to bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest, 9 is applied to most classifications. A statute affecting a "fun-
damental right" or employing a "suspect classification," however, is
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. This standard requires that the state
have a "compelling" or "overriding" interest and that the means used
are necessary to accomplish the legislative objective. 20  Fundamental
rights include freedom of religion, 2' freedom of association, 22  suf-
frage,2 3 travel, 24 and procreation. 25 Suspect classifications are race, 2
national origin, 27 and alienage.28
In Graham v. Richardson,29 the Supreme Court held that a statu-
tory classification based upon alienage was subject to strict judicial
scrutiny 30 because aliens are an inherently suspect class. 31 Similarly,
in In re Griffiths,32 the Court reaffirmed the strict scrutiny approach
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowack, Realigning Standards of
Review Under Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive
Classifications, 62 CEo. L. J. 1071 (1974).
19. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ("if the classification has some 'reasonable basis' it does not
offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality' ").
20. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
21. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
23. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
25. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Other fundamental
rights include free speech, Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and
the right of a criminal defendant to appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
27. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
28. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
29. 403 U.S. 365 (1970).
30. Id. at 372. An Arizona statute conditioned eligibility for welfare benefits on
citizenship. Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1970-71). A companion case, Sailer v.
Leger, 403 U.S. 365, 365 (1971), also involved a citizenship requirement to qualify
for welfare benefits, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432 (2) (1968). Under a strict scrutiny
test the state must show that its statutory classification is based on an "important,"
"compelling" or "overriding" interest and that the means used to protect the state
interest are necessary. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)
(compelling state interest); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (over-
riding state interest).
31. 403 U.S. at 372. Other suspect classifications include race, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964), and nationality, Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
32. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). In Griffiths, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
which required United States citizenship for eligibility to admission to the bar. Id. at
729.
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to prohibitions against aliens because they constitute a " 'discrete and
insular minority' . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate. ' 33 Sugarman v. Dougall,3 4 decided the same day as In
re Griffiths, struck down a New York prohibition against aliens in the
competitive civil service,3 5 because the state lacked substantial justifi-
cations for the statute. 36 In dissent from Sugarman v. Dougall and In
re Griffiths, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the proper inquiry was a
rational basis test. 37 Presaging the next development of the Court's
analysis, Justice Rehnquist implied that the application of close scru-
tiny was a matter of judicial fiat since it lacked precedent and persua-
sive explanation.38
Although the Sugarman Court held that the New York statute could
not withstand close scrutiny, it noted that state action intended to
"preserve the basic conception of a political community"3 s would not
be the subject of strict scrutiny. 40  The ramifications of this caveat
surfaced in Foley v. Connelie,41 where a New York statute requiring
33. Id. at 721 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372). See United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
34. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
35. The statute imposed citizenship as a condition for eligibility for the competi-
tive class of the civil service. N.Y. Civ. SEmv. LAW § 53 (McKinney 1972-73).
36. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642. The Court rejected the state's contention that a
state may regulate its resources for the benefit of the citizens of the state. This
doctrine called the "special public interest doctrine" provided the basis for early
decisions permitting state discrimination against aliens. The doctrine was rooted in
the concept of privileges versus rights and the state's ability to control the public
domain. See Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (sustaining a New York statute
restricting employment in public works to United States citizens); Heim v. McCall,
239 U.S. 175 (1915) (upholding a statute limiting employment on public works to
citizens); and Ohio ex. rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (sustaining an
ordinance prohibiting aliens from obtaining licenses to operate pool halls). But see
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) (invalidating a statute requiring employers
of more than five employees to employ 80% United States citizens because the
discrimination did not pertain to the regulation or distribution of the public domain
or the common property or resources of the state). In rejecting the public interest
doctrine, the Sugarman Court held that fiscal integrity did not constitute a substan-
tial state interest. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 643-45.
37. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 653. Under the rational basis test the state must show
that it has a legitimate interest and'that the means used bear a rational relationship
to the interest sought to be protected.
38. Id. at 657.
39. Id. at 647-48 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)). The
Court reasoned that a state is responsible for the operation of its government. Jobs
within the political community are those "state elective and important nonelective
executive, legislative, and judicial positions, or officers who participate directly in
the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy . . . that go to the heart
of representative government." Id. at 647.
40. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648.
41. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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state troopers to be United States citizens was upheld. 42 The major-
ity 43 reasoned that New York had justified its classification by showing
a rational relationship between the government interest sought to be
protected and the limiting classification. 44 As a result of the Sugar-
man and Foley decisions, a two-tiered standard of review for alienage
cases emerged, 45 distinct from other classifications which remained
subject to a singular method of analysis. 4  Restrictions on aliens that
affected economic interests 47 were still subject to strict scrutiny, but
those restrictions which served political functions were not required to
"clear the high hurdle of strict scrutiny. ' 48
42. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 215 (3) (McKinney 1972).
43. The decision was § 6-3 with Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissent-
ing. These three, joined by Justice Blackmun, also dissented in Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 82 (1979), and Cabell v Chavez-Salido, 50 U.S.L.W. 4095, 4099 (Jan.
12, 1982).
44. Foley, 435 U.S. at 300. The state's interest was to have its laws enforced by
United States citizens.
45. Id. at 301-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Any doubts as to the existence of a
two-tiered standard of review was dispelled in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 50
U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982), where the Court criticized the dissenters for imply-
ing that the cases do not establish a dual standard. Id. at 4097 n.6. The dual standard
is critiqued in Judicial Standards, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 867, 878-79 (1980), and
Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HA1v. L. REV.
1516, 1521-23 (1979). See Maltz, The Burger Court and Alienage Classifications, 31
OKLA. L. REV. 671, 673-80 (1978). See also Note, Alienage and Public Employment:
The Need for an Intermediate Standard in Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 163,
194-99 (1980) (contending that an intermediate level of review would allow an even
balancing of competing values in political community cases).
46. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text.
47. See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (invalidating a
Puerto Rico statute permitting only United States citizens to practice privately as civil
engineers, applying a strict scrutiny test); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
(using a strict scrutiny test to strike down a New York statute barring resident aliens
from state financial aid for higher education); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(strict scrutiny applied to statute limiting membership in the Connecticut Bar to
citizens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (strict scrutiny of
a statute prohibiting persons "ineligible for citizenship" from obtaining commercial
fishing licenses); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (Arizona Constitution prohib-
ited employers of more than five employees from hiring more than 20 % aliens); and
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (city ordinance diserminatorily enforced to
preclude Chinese persons from operating laundries). These exclusions struck at the
noncitizen's ability to exist in the community. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295
(1978). When a state denies to an alien a means of livelihood it denies him the right to
enter and abide within the state, for in ordinary circumstances one cannot live where
one cannot work. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
48. Foley, 435 U.S. at 295. The Court has concluded that strict scrutiny is out of
place when the restriction serves a political function; rather, the state need only show
that there is a rational basis for the discriminatory practice. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at
4097. See Hull, Resident Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: The Burger Court's
Retreat from Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1980); O'Fallon, To
Preserve the Conception of a Political Community, 57 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 777 (1980).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Ambach v. Norwick49 confirmed
the two-tier approach. The Court sustained a New York statute pro-
hibiting the hiring of aliens as public school teachers.50  Reasoning
that education was a political function, the Court inquired whether
the statute bore a rational relationship to the state's interest.
51 It
concluded that because the people of New York had determined that
those teaching their youth should be citizens, a statute which achieved
this goal was valid. 52 By allowing a state to construe broadly the
political community exception, however, the Court demonstrated the
circular nature of its reasoning and rendered the rational basis test
virtually useless.
The political community exception recently was applied in Cabell
v. Chavez-Salido,5 3 where the Supreme Court upheld a California
citizenship eligibility requirement for a group of peace officer posi-
tions. 54 The Court reasoned that because a probation officer "may"
personify the state's sovereign power to the parolee and "may" sym-
bolize the community's control over the parolee, a citizenship require-
ment "may" be an appropriate limitation.5 5 This holding, in effect,
grants the states unfettered discretion when imposing restrictions on
resident aliens' eligibility for occupational licenses and job categories.
Two pivotal aspects of the Court's analysis must be examined closely
in order to evaluate properly state statutory arrangements. The first is
how the Court has arrived at a definition of the political community.
The second is whether the statute should be analyzed alone or as part
of a larger statutory scheme.
A. Defining the Political Community
The political community exception first appeared in Truax v.
Raich.56 A statutory restriction on the percentage of noncitizen labor-
ers a private firm could employ 57 was struck down on the grounds that
49. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). See Supreme Court Review 1978-79 Term, Equal Protec-
tion, Ambach v. Norwick, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 484 (1980).
50. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80-81.
51. Id. at 80.
52. Id. at 81.
53. 50 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982).
54. Section 1031 of the California Government Code requires that "public officers
or employees declared by law to be peace officers" be citizens of the United States.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1031(a) (West 1980). The State Penal Code enumerates the
specific positions which are deemed to be peace officers. Prior to 1980 over 70
positions were included as peace officers. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1982).
55. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4099.
56. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
57. Id. at 35.
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a state could not lawfully abridge an individual's right to work "in the
common occupations of the community." 58 The Supreme Court dis-
tinguished the facts of the case, however, from the situation in which
a discriminatory practice could be mandated by the "public inter-
est." 59 This notion re-emerged in Sugarman v. Dougall, when the
Court implied that a state could discriminate only where citizenship
bore a rational relationship to positions which were at the "heart of
representative government. '6 0  This narrow exception was described
and expanded in Foley v. Connelie, where the Court inquired
whether the position involved "discretionary decision making, or exe-
cution of policy which substantially affects members of the political
community.""' The Court distinguished the duties of a state trooper
from "routine public employment or other 'common occupations of
the community' [which] exercise no broad powers over people gener-
ally" 6 2 because police officers exercise plenary discretionary authority.
The scope of the political community exception was expanded in
Ambach v. Norwick 3 when the Supreme Court noted the degree of
"responsibility and discretion"61 4 public school teachers exercised as
well as the significance of the governmental function they per-
formed.6 5 The majority concluded that some state functions such as
education were so "bound up in the operation of the state as a govern-
mental entity" that the exclusion of aliens was permissible.66 The
dissent,6 7 however, stated that a teacher, like an attorney, was not "so
close to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator 6 8
of policy.
This disagreement over the scope of the political community was
highlighted in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, where the majority an-
58. Id. at 41.
59. Id. at 39-40.
60. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
61. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296.
62. Id. at 298-99.
63. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
64. Id. at 75.
65. Id. at 76. This analysis recalls Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Sugarman and
Griffiths in which he noted that even low level civil servants were policy makers,
because those who apply law to facts are as much governors as those who write the
laws. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 661 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist stated that
policymaking is no longer the exclusive domain of legislators, judges and top adminis-
trators. He suggested that an alien would not function well with the public nor with
his fellow workers. Id. at 662 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 73-74.
67. In dissent, Justice Blackmun asserted that Foley represented a narrowly iso-
lated situation and that the case instead fell in line with Sugarman, Examining Board
v. Flores de Otero and Griffths. Id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 89 n.9.
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nounced that the Supreme Court will look only to the "importance of
the [state] function. '6 9  While earlier decisions had relied on factors
such as the degree of discretion involved in the job and the effect of
the position in question on the community, such considerations now
would be subordinated to the nebulous criterion of assessing the im-
portance of the function, the definition of which is necessarily the
primary responsibility of the state legislatures. 70 Thus, it appears that
the political community is that which the political community says it
is.71
In reaction to this view of the "community's process of self-defini-
tion,"' 72 Justice Blackmun in his dissent, criticized the reinstatement
"of state parochialism in public employment. '" 73 Justice Blackmun
demanded a return to a rigorous test because the states should not be
permitted to reserve for citizens every "vital public and political
role."' 74 Furthermore, if a position involved execution rather than
formulation or review of executive policy, Justice Blackmun argued
that the Sugarman requirements would be satisfied only if a basic
governmental function was fulfilled and "a most fundamental obliga-
tion of the government to its constituency" 75 was involved.
B. The Scope of the Analysis
An important aspect of the judicial analysis of the political commu-
nity is the challenged statute itself.76 Evaluating the specificity of a
statute's classification helps to determine whether a claim that the
69. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4097 n.7.
70. Id. at 4098. The Court stated that neither Foley nor Ambach represented the
outer limits of a permissible citizenship requirement. As a contrasting example, the
Court cited the juror who acts under specific instructions and affects a small number
of people. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aJ'd summarily,
426 U.S. 913 (1976).
71. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4098. It is important to note that because aliens are
barred from the voting process, they have no voice in the political community.
72. Id. at 4097.
73. Id. at 4099 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977), citing In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973)). Justice Blackum sought to avoid the danger of the
Sugarman exception swallowing the Sugarman rule. Id. at 4101 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). While not accepting the resolution of either Foley or Ambach, Justice
Blackmun stated that these prior decisions required a state to show that it historically
has reserved the particular position for its citizens as a matter of "constitutional
prerogative." Id. at 4099.
75. Id. These criteria could be satisfied by such factors as the exercise of "plenary
coercive authority" and "control over a substantial portion of the citizen population."
Id.
76. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (quoting Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at
605).
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classification serves an important political function is legitimate." A
classification which is over inclusive or underinclusive tends to under-
mine such a claim. An overinclusive statute is one which encompasses
classifications which bear no relation to the statute's underlying pur-
pose. 78  An underinclusive statute is one which fails to include classifi-
cations necessary to accomplish the statute's underlying goal. 79 The
Supreme Court noted in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, that the specificity
of a classification indicates the legitimacy of the claim that the statute
is designed to serve a governmental function. 0
Nevertheless, the scope of the Supreme Court's inquiry in this area
has become increasingly narrow. In Sugarman v. Dougall, one section
of the New York Civil Service Law was judged in the context of the
state's overall statutory framework. 8' After an examination which
included New York's constitutional provisions as well as sections of the
Civil Service Law and the Public Officers Law, 2 the Court found
that the statute lacked the necessary precision 3 because of the dispar-
ate treatment of aliens.
77. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4097.
78. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 631 (1969); and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). An over-
inclusive statute creates greater inequities than an underinclusive one, since an
imposition of burdens on those beyond the statute's rationale is more objectionable
than what might amount to exemptions. See also Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723,
727 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1086-87 (1969).
79. The statute should be drawn with precision to avoid affecting some, but not
all, persons who logically should be covered by its rationale. Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F.
Supp. 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4097.
81. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 639. The Court distinguished New York's legislative
haphazard scheme from one which bars some or all resident aliens from carefully
defined and limited classifications of public employment on a uniform and consistent
basis. Id.
82. Id. at 640. The Court noted that aliens are ineligible to serve as Governor and
Lieutenant Governor, N.Y. CONST., art. IV, § 2; State Attorney and Comptroller,
N.Y. CONST., art. V, § 1; and members of the Legislature, N.Y. CONST., art. III, § 7.
Also, the Public Officers Law requires that all "civil officers" be citizens. N.Y. PuB.
OFF. LAW § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). The Civil Service Law established four
categories of classified service-exempt, labor, noncompetitive and competitive. Of
the four classes only the latter required citizenship. N.Y. Civ. Smav. LAW §§ 40-44 &
§ 53 (McKinney 1973).
83. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 643. Determining that the statute was overbroad, the
Court held that it swept indiscriminately. The Court illustrated the statute's breadth
by pointing to its application to competitive class members such as sanitation men,
typists, office workers and policy formulators. Registering surprise at the inconsist-
ency of the statute, the Court stated: "[i]ndeed, even § 53 permits an alien to hold
classified civil service positions under certain circumstances." Id. Moreover, the
statute's breadth increased when viewed in light of the state's constitutional and
statutory schemes, because of its disparate treatment of aliens. Id.
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The decay of a multifaceted review began in Foley, where the
Supreme Court considered only the single statutory prohibition .
4
There was no inquiry whether law enforcement agents other than
state troopers must be citizens, nor did the Court examine any other
New York statute.8 5 The statute confined its limitation to a single
position, and the Court was able to avoid any discussion of the overall
statutory scheme.
While the challenged statute in Ambach also imposed restrictions
on a single position, the Supreme Court was compelled to address the
statute's breadth because the district court had determined that the
statute was too broad.8 6 The rationale of the district court's determi-
nation had been that the statute excluded all resident aliens from
teaching jobs regardless of the subject to be taught, the alien's nation-
ality, his relationship to this country, or his willingness to substitute
an oath of allegiance to the United States.8 7  The Supreme Court
concluded that the "restriction is carefully framed."88  Noting that
only public school teachers were subject to this restriction, the Court
distinguished In re Griffiths where all prospective alien attorneys had
been prevented from pursuing their chosen profession .8  The Court,
however, did not find it inconsistent that neither private school teach-
ers nor educators at state institutions of higher learning were required
to be citizens. 0
84. Foley, 435 U.S. at 293.
85. Id. at 299 n.8. The Court based its decision, in part, on a survey of the other
forty-nine states, most of which required police to be United States citizens. Writing
for the dissent, Justice Marshall challenged the validity of many of the statutes since
they had been enacted prior to Sugarman. Id. at 312 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643). Interestingly, the Court did not find
it unconstitutionally discriminatory that some aliens may be barred from ever be-
coming state troopers because they might not become eligible for citizenship before
they become too old to qualify for the job. Id. at 293 n.1. In fact, the Sugarman
notion that a state may not use a restriction which "sweeps indiscriminately," was
relegated to a footnote. Id. at 296-97 n.5 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at
643).
86. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 71. See Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
87. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 71-72.
88. Id. at 80. The dissent found, however, that the statute was "neither narrowly
confined nor precise in its application." Id. at 87. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 76 n.6. The Court emphasized the distinction between a private occupa-
tion and a government function. Id.
90. Id. at 70 nn.1 & 3. Furthermore, the fact that the statute authorized the
Commissioner of Education to waive the citizenship requirement did not trouble the
Court. Id. The Court dismissed the contention that the state rationally cannot
exclude aliens from the classroom while permitting them to vote for and participate
in local school boards. Id. at 81 n.15.
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The abandonment of a broad analysis was achieved in Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, where the challenged statute was alleged to be both
overinclusive 9' and underinclusive. 92 The district court stated that
the statute was overinclusive because it encompassed numerous job
classifications which could not, under any standard, belong to the
political community. 3 The Supreme Court, overruling the district
court, criticized the lower court's assumption that if the statute was
overinclusive at all it should not stand. The proper standard was thus:
"whether the restriction reaches so far and is so broad and haphazard
as to belie the state's claim that it is only attempting to ensure that an
important function of government be in the hands of those having the
'fundamental legal bond of citizenship.' ' ' 94 Moreover, "the classifica-
tion used need not be precise; there need only be a substantial fit." 9 5
The statute in question was found to be "sufficiently tailored."9 6
Although the majority admitted that some of the positions listed in the
statute were only 'tenuously' related to traditional law enforcement
functions, these questionable classifications were deemed to be com-
paratively few in number. 7 Furthermore, the Court limited its hold-
ing to probation officers without considering the other peace officers
included in the statute.
As a result of the Cabell decision, state legislatures will be encour-
aged to promulgate statutes which include positions outside the politi-
cal community but which serve, in some way, an important govern-
ment function. Cabell itself illustrates the potential injurious effect of
this lenient approach because the original purpose of grouping the
peace officer positions together bore no relation to the goal of preserv-
ing an important governmental function for citizens; rather, the origi-
nal purpose was to ensure that particular persons received insurance
benefits.9 8
91. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4097.
92. Id. at 4098 n.12. In support of this claim it was alleged that other positions
such as school teachers do not mandate citizenship.
93. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984, 986 (C.D. Cal. 1980). The district
court stated: "[t]here appears to be no justification whatever for excluding aliens,
even those who have applied for citizenship, from holding public employment as
cemetery sextons, furniture and bedding inspectors .... " Id. The district court also
included an extensive list of additions and deletions to the category of peace officer.
Id. at 986 n.6.
94. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4097.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 4098.
97. Id. The court attempted to justify three of these-Dental Board Inspectors,
Parks and Recreation employees and voluntary fire wardens-stating that they are
designated peace officers only when they perform a law enforcement duty. Id. n. 10.
98. Id. at 4100 n.5. See Hetherington v. State Personnel Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 582,
600, 147 Cal. Rptr. 300, 311 (1978). "Because peace officers appear to have enjoyed
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III. Interpretations of Supreme Court Analysis by
State and Federal Courts
The Supreme Court, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,99 granted resident
aliens the bare minimum of rights to employment guaranteed by the
Constitution. In effect, the Court announced that only a haphazard
statutory prohibition would be invalidated. 100 While states may not
abridge the rights emanating from the haphazard standard, they may
accord greater rights to resident aliens.' 0 ' Although the precedential
value of state and lower federal court decisions is questionable, 0 2 an
examination of how the state and federal courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court's decisions reveals alternate criteria for evaluating
restrictions on resident alien employment opportunities.
Federal and state courts have taken a lenient approach in applying
the standards set forth by the Supreme Court. The courts have em-
phasized the definition of the political community. When determining
the political nature of a particular position, courts have focused on
whether the "formulation, execution, or review [of] broad public
policy" was part of that position's duties. 103 Courts also have consid-
ered whether a position requires security.10 4
The Florida Supreme Court's liberal position in this area is demon-
strated by its narrow definition of the political community and is
better benefits in times past, many employee groups, even tangentially associated
with the role of peace officer, have persuaded the Legislature to include them within
the term 'peace officers.' " Id.
99. 50 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982).
100. Id. at 4097.
101. This situation is analogous to the fourth amendment area where the federal
government has decreased privacy rights while state governments have accorded
greater privacy rights to criminal defendants. See, e.g., Walinski and Tucker, Expec-
tations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1981). Another analogous area exists in the fifth and sixth
amendments where New York courts presently accord more expansive rights to
counsel to criminal defendants than the United States Supreme Court extends. See,
e.g., Note, The Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
351 (1982).
102. The Wyoming Supreme Court in State v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601
P.2d 174 (Wyo. 1979), in striking down a statute which barred aliens from the
practice of law, speculated that in light of the Supreme Court's then recent decisions,
if In re Griffiths were redecided, the statute would have been upheld. Id. at 176. If
this were true, those state and lower court decisions which relied upon In re Grif-
fiths, Wong v. Hohnstrom, 405 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Minn. 1975) (no distinction
between denying aliens the right to become pharmacists and the right to practice
law); accord Szeto v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 508 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. La.
1981), would be of questionable precedential value.
103. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). See Cheng v. Illinois, 438 F.
Supp. 917, 918 (D. Ill. 1977) (notary public not involved in "important state pol-
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representative of a number of courts.105 In Graham v. Ramani,06° the
Florida Supreme Court invalidated a statute requiring notaries public
to be citizens, reasoning that a notary performs ministerial rather than
policy making functions, 10 7 and the position is, therefore, outside the
political community. Two other state courts reached the same conclu-
sion,10 8 relying on the holding in In re Griffiths that although attor-
neys have great responsibility, they are not court officers and do not
formulate policy. 0  Despite the fact that it was argued that notaries
public perform an important government function, the courts exam-
ined specific duties to determine that the position did not fall within
the ambit of the political community."10
When state courts analyzed the precision of the means used to
exclude aliens from public employment or from receiving state issued
icy"); Taggart v. Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733, 739 (D. Md. 1975) (notaries public do
not participate in formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy). See also
61 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 528 (1978) (member of state board of dental examiners is a
civil officer because he formulates, executes and reviews broad public policy); 60 Op.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 35 (1977) (while a notary public is a public officer, no executive
power is exercised); 1977 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 77-297 (permitting employment of alien
as judge's secretary); 1976 Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 468 (municipality may not impose a
ban on the employment of aliens except where the position involves the formulation,
execution or review of public policy); 1974 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 18 (restrictions on
positions which formulate, execute or review public policy are constitutional); 1974
Op. W. Va. Att'y Gen. 273 (Attorney General recommends that citizenship require-
ments be imposed only where position involves formulation, execution or review of
broad public policy.).
104. Herriot v. Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 48, 63, 500 P.2d 101,110 (Wash. 1972)
(position of transit operator neither rises to the status of public office nor involves a
requirement of security); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735,738 (D. Ariz. 1972),
aff'd, 413 U.S. 902 (1973) (Social Service positions neither involve internal or external
national security nor require security clearance.).
105. Cheng v. Illinois, 438 F. Supp. 917, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (citizenship require-
ment for a notary public is unconstitutional because the position does not involve
important state policy); Taggart v. Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733, 739 (D. Md. 1975)
(using a valid state objective standard the court rejected the argument that a notary
exercises the sovereign's power and constitutes an important nonelective judicial
position).
106. 383 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1980).
107. See note 110 infra.
108. Cheng v. Illinois, 438 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Taggart v. Mandel, 391
F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1975).
109. 413 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1973).
110. Graham v. Ramani, 383 So. 2d 634, 638 (Fla. 1980); Cheng v. Illinois, 438
F. Supp. 917, 918 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1977); and Taggart v. Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733,
735 (D. Md. 1975). The courts cited such ministerial functions as acknowledging
written instruments, solemnizing marriages, administering oaths, certifying copies of
documents and attending at a demand, tender or deposit.
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licenses, they considered whether alternate means of protecting the
state's interest in securing competent employees were available. These
courts have suggested that alternatives such as oaths, 1 ' exams,
112 civil
liability,1 1 3 posting bond," 4 and review by superiors, 1 5 would pro-
tect adequately state interests. By conducting this line of analysis,
courts have sought to avoid a complete ban on the employment of
aliens.
In Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court used a federal pre-
emption analysis as a second basis on which to invalidate a discrimina-
tory statute.11 7 Employing such an analysis, a court seeks to deter-
mine whether a state has usurped an exclusive federal authority." 8
111. Cheng v. Illinois, 438 F. Supp. 917, 918 n.4 (D.Ill. 1977); Taggert v.
Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733, 740 (D. Md. 1975).
112. Wong v. Hohnstrom, 405 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D. Minn. 1975); Foley v.
Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), aff'd,
435 U.S. 291 (1978).
113. Cheng, 438 F. Supp. at 918 n.4.
114. Id.
115. Taggart, 391 F. Supp. at 740.
116. Ruiz-Cano v. San Diego, 98 Cal. App. 3d 803, 159 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Ct. App.
1979) (invalidating provision in county charter requiring citizenship for municipal
employment); State v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174 (Wyo. 1979)
(invalidating citizenship requirement to practice law); Perkins v. Board of Veterinar-
ians, Civil Action 72-1174 (D. Md. oral opinion, Mar. 16, 1973) (invalidating citizen-
ship requirement for veterinarian's license); Szeto v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentis-
try, 508 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. La. 1980) (struck down citizenship requirement for
dentist's license); Kilaru v. Watts, 59 F.R.D. 569 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (refusing to grant
defendants summary judgment in an action for monetary damages as a result of
application for the civil service position of librarian being denied because of citizen-
ship requirement); Sundram v. Niagara Falls, 77 Misc. 2d 1002, 357 N.Y.S.2d 943
(Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1973), afJ'd, 44 A.D.2d 906, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (4th Dep't
1974) (struck down statute requiring citizenship for taxi driver's license); Arias v.
Examining Bd. of Refrig. & Air Con. Tech., 353 F. Supp. 857 (D.P.R. 1972) (struck
statute barring aliens from obtaining a technician's license); Younus v. Shabat, 336
F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 7th Cir. 72-1051 (Jan. 3, 1973) (ordering the
Chicago City College System to grant tenure to alien professors who were refused
tenure on the basis of alienage, although they were otherwise qualified).
117. 403 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1970).
118. See Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89
YALE L.J. 940, 948-52 (1980). The author argues that a state is preempted from
enacting legislation unless the state regulation is authorized expressly by Congress or
if it is analogous to a federal regulation wherein implicit authorization from Congress
can be inferred. Id. Note, Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protec-
tion? 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1078-79 (1979). The author contends that a state may
exclude resident aliens from its political offices and functions because, although the
federal government invites aliens to enter the United States, admission does not
confer citizenship or membership in the political community. See also Note, Preemp-
tion-State Statute Prohibiting Nonresidents or Aliens From Fishing in Its Waters is
Preempted by Federal Law, Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1740
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Although the Supreme Court has not pursued this line of reasoning in
state discrimination cases," many lower courts have.120  According
to the federal preemption analysis, Congress established the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service' 2' pursuant to its constitutional au-
thority to regulate immigration and naturalization. 2 2 The intent of
federal immigration legislation is to regulate alien employment by
controlling the terms and conditions of the immigration process. 23
Congress has not excluded specifically resident aliens from employ-
ment. Therefore, state legislation which does exclude resident aliens
obstructs the operation of federal law and is invalid.
IV. State Statutory Schemes
In many states, employment legislation includes a citizenship re-
quirement. State statutory schemes vary widely, however, as to the
particular professions or occupations involved. For instance, twelve
states expressly require citizenship for public school teaching certifica-
tion. 2 4  Nineteen states and the District of Columbia permit nonciti-
(1977), 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 637, 639 (1977) (Congressional intent to occupy
an area can be inferred from a broad and complex federal legislative scheme.).
119. In the Supreme Court cases discussed above the Court has declined to address
this issue. Cf. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) ("[I]t is the business of the
political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or
the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the condition of entry and residence of aliens.");
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95 (1975) (Congress and the President
have broad power over immigration and naturalization which the states do not
possess).
120. C.D.R. Enters. v. Board of Educ. of N.Y.C., 412 F. Supp. 1164, 1171-72(E.D. N.Y. 1976); Teitscheid v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299, 303 (D. Vt. 1971);
Younus v. Shabat, 336 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 7th Cir 72-1051
(Jan. 3, 1973); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735, 740 (D. Ariz 1972), aff'd
summarily, 413 U.S. 902 (1973); Hsieh v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Seattle, 79 Wash.
2d 529, 536, 488 P.2d 515, 540 (Wash. 1971). But see Herriot v. Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d
48, 55, 500 P.2d 101, 106 (Wash. 1972) (court declined to decide case on preemption
issue because job of transit operator is not specifically mentioned in schedule pre-
pared by the Secretary of Labor).
121. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. 11977 & Supp.
11 1978 & Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980)).
122. U.S. Const. art 1, § 8, cl. 4.
123. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182a (14), the Department of Labor devised proce-
dures whereby immigrant labor certification will be granted or denied. 20 C.F.R. §§
656.1-656.62 (1981). The Secretary of Labor prepares Schedule A which lists occupa-
tions for which there are not sufficient United States workers who are qualified and
available. Id. § 656.10. Schedule B lists occupations where there are sufficient United
States workers. Id. § 656.12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (catego-
ries of preference priorities for admitting immigrants).
124. IDAHO CODE § 33-1202 (4) (1981) (requires citizenship or a declaration of
intent to become naturalized, and provides for automatic revocation of certificate if
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zens to be certified school teachers.12 5 The remaining nineteen states
delegate the establishment of qualifications and the regulation of
licenses to the board of education.126
full citizenship is not acquired in 7 years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 21-1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981-82) (requires citizenship or declaration of intent, but if citizenship
not acquired within 6 years, license is cancelled); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 38G
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1978 & Supp. 1981) (permits temporary certificate for up to 2
years, renewable two times, if declaration of intent is filed); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 75-6004(3), §§ 75-6005-06 (1971) (permits provisional certification under special
circumstances); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:26-1, 18A:26-8.1 (West 1968) (permits
provisional certification upon filing declaration of intent subject to revocation if
citizenship not perfected within five years of date of issuance); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
3001 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-36-07, 15-36-11 (1981) (must declare
intention to become naturalized, or citizenship requirement may be waived for
temporary employment subject to annual renewal); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1202
(Purdon Supp. 1981-82) (requirement waived for foreign language and exchange
teachers, upon filing declaration of intent eligible for provisional college certifica-
tion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1303 (1977) (requirement waived for temporary em-
ployment of foreign teachers, as long as they do not advocate overthrowing the
government); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.044 (Vernon 1972) (requires evidence of
intent to become naturalized; exchange teacher may be employed for one year if his
nation grants a similar privilege to a Texas teacher); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
28A.67.020 (Supp. 1981) (one year probationary certificate available upon declaring
intent to become naturalized and the superintendent may, upon request by school
district, grant standard certificate to teach; alien must subscribe to oath to support
the U.S. and Washington Constitutions); W. VA. CODE § 18A-3-1 (1977) (exception
provides permit to teach if declaration of intent is filed).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.020 (b), & (c) (Supp. 1981); Aniz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
15-504, 15-532 (Supp. 1981); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44259 (West 1978); CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 22-60-102 to 105 (Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-114 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 231.17 (1) (West Supp. 1982), but see id. § 231.17(5) (no certificate
shall be issued to a citizen of a nation which is antagonistic to democratic govern-
ment, except to a refugee or resident alien from Cuba who has been lawfully
admitted); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6.1-3-3, & 20-6.1-4-2 (Burns Supp. 1981); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 260.2, 260.12 (West 1972 & Supp. 1981-82) (gives board of education
discretion to license applicant from another country who evidences requisite qualifi-
cations); Ky. REV. STAT. § 161.040 (1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1751
(Supp. 1981-82); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1533 (Supp. 1981-82) (amended in
1977 to delete the citizenship requirement); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 168.021-168.041
(Vernon Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1247.06 (1976) (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-
1247.12 which required citizenship was repealed by 1974 Neb. Laws 678, § 21); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 391.060 (1979) (permits certification of lawful permanent resident
aliens); OR. REV. STAT. §342.143 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. ANN. § 13-42-6 (1975)
(permits certification of resident aliens only if intent to become naturalized is de-
clared or when in the "best interests" of a state institution); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-
2-15-53-2-25, 53-1-18 (1970 & Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §12 (1974); VA.
CODE § 22.1-298 (1980); Wyo. STAT. §§ 21-2-304-7-304 (1977) (requires candidates
for certification to pass an exam on the federal and state constitution).
126. ALA. CODE §§ 16-23-1, 16-23-2 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1201 (1980 &
Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-145 (West Supp. 1981-82); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1201, 1202 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-655(a) (Supp. 1981)
(classification by the State Board shall be based on academic and professional train-
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According to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, seventy percent of the resident aliens in the United States
reside in six states - New York, California, Texas, Florida, New
Jersey and Illinois. 2 7 The regulation of resident alien employment is
relevant particularly to legislators in these states. A survey of the
statutory schemes illustrates current policies and trends and reveals an
increasing sensitivity on the part of state legislators to the issue of alien
employment. Significantly, no state has imposed a restriction on aliens
becoming teachers since the decision in Ambach. In addition, al-
though the states uniformly preclude noncitizens from such elective
offices as governor, 128 lieutenant governor129 and senator,130 they dif-
fer with respect to official positions such as notary public. 131
The logical result of an inability to impose a blanket prohibition on
the hiring of aliens is to bar aliens from specific positions. For exam-
ple, while there is no citizenship requirement for eligibility to the New
York Civil Service, all civil 'officers' must be United States citizens. 
132
ing as well as experience); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 297-2 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
1388 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-411 (West Supp. 1982); MD. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 2-205 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.04, 125.05 (West Supp. 1982);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-9 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 186-88 (1978); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-296 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3319.23 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-154 (Supp. 1981);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-11-2 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-25-110 to 120 (Law. Co-op
1977); (In South Carolina, the Regulations mandate citizenship, id. R43-62 (1.1)
(1982)); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.28, 118.19 (West 1973 & Supp. 1981-82).
127. SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 97.
128. CAL. CoNsT. art. V, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5; ILL. CoNsT. art. V, § 3;
N.J. CONsT. art. V, § 1 2; N.Y. CoNsT. art. IV, § 6; TEx. CoNST. art. IV, § 4.
129. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 9; FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 5; ILL. CONsT. art. V, § 3;
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6; TEx. CoNsT. art. IV, § 16.
130. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4; FLA. CONST. art III, § 15; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.Y. CoNsT. art. III, § 7; TEx. CONsT. art. III, § 7.
131. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8201 (West 1980) (citizenship not required); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 117.01 (West Supp. 1974-80) (citizenship required; but see Graham v.
Ramani, 383 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1980) (holding that § 117.01 violates the equal
protection clause)); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 99, § I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82) (permits
resident aliens who have resided in the state for 90 days to become notaries public);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 130 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) (citizenship required); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:7-10-14 (West Supp. 1981-82) (citizenship not required); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5949 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (resident citizenship of the United States
required).
132. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). Section 4 imposes a
citizenship requirement for all special appointive peace officers. Id. § 4. A broad
definition of 'civil officers' effectively would foreclose many jobs to resident aliens. A
civil office is defined as one that involves "some portion of the sovereign power." See
1967 Op. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. 60; New York Post v. Moses, 12 A.D.2d 243, 250, 210
N.Y.S.2d 88, 95 (1st Dep't 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 10 N.Y.2d 199, 176 N.E.2d
709, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1961); see also Op. N.Y. Arr'y GEN. 454 (1911) (suggesting that
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More than twenty professions are regulated by the New York Board
of Regents.1 33  Nearly half of these professions expressly require
United States citizenship for eligibility to receive a license. 134 Despite
the intent to impose or refrain from imposing a citizenship require-
ment, there is significant disparity in the professions selected to in-
clude only citizens. While medical professionals such as dentists, 135
veterinarians 136 and dental hygienists137 must be citizens, optome-
trists, 1 38 podiatrists 13 and nurses140 need not be citizens to qualify for a
license. Similarly, aliens are not eligible to be professional engi-
neers,141 land surveyors 142 or landscape architects, 43 but they may
qualify for an architect's 144 or certified public accountant's 145 license.
It is unclear whether citizenship bears a rational relationship to com-
petence in these professions. Furthermore, some New York statutes
subject issuance of the license to inconsistent exceptions, such as pro-
an officer is comparable to a principal-agent relationship whereas an employee has
no discretion or power as in a master-servant relationship); Haller v. Carlson, 42
A.D.2d 829, 346 N.Y.S.2d 108 (4th Dep't 1973) (enumerating the functions and
duties of an officer).
133. N.Y. EnUc. LAW § 6506 (McKinney 1981).
134. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6506-7904 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1981-82). For
example, § 6506 empowers the Board of Regents to indorse a license issued by
another state or country if the applicant for a New York license is a United States
citizen or has filed a declaration of intent to become naturalized unless the commis-
sioner's regulations waive the citizenship rquirement. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6506 (McK-
inney 1981). New York statutes which require citizenship generally include the filing
of a declaration of intent to become a citizen as an alternative means of meeting the
necessary qualifications. In effect, a requirement that the alien file the declaration
provides a period of time in which an alien who is not yet eligible for naturalization
will not be precluded from his profession. It is nevertheless a citizenship requirement
because it coerces aliens to give up their nationality in order to gain access to a
livelihood. The obvious purpose of this type of requirement is to promote naturaliza-
tion; however, this is not a proper state objective. Naturalization is wholly within the
federal domain. See notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
135. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6604 (6) (McKinney 1981).
136. Id. § 6704 (6).
137. Id. § 6609 (6). Additionally, citizenship is required for pharmacists, id. §
6805, and chiropractors, § 6554.
138. Id. § 7104 (6). Similarly, opticians need not be citizens. Id. § 7124 (6).
139. Id. § 7004 (6).
140. Id. § 6904 (6).
141. Id. § 7206.
142. Id. § 7206a. Provision is made for foreign consultants who are present in the
state for a single project.
143. Id. § 7324 (6).
144. Id. § 7304.
145. Id. § 7603. Other professions which do not require citizenship are certified
social workers, id. § 7704; physical therapists, id. § 6734; speech pathologists, id.
§ 8206 and occupational therapists, id. § 7904.
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viding for a limited permit to practice or empowering the commis-
sioner to waive the citizenship requirement. 14  The New York legisla-
ture has been sensitive to judicial findings on the issue of citizenship.
In response to In re Griffiths, for example, the legislature deleted the
citizenship requirement for admission to practice law.147 There is no
indication, however, that the New York legislature intends to open
public employment to resident aliens.
California, in comparison to other states, takes a liberal approach 48
to the employment of aliens and has removed many legislative barriers
during the past decade. In Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State of Califor-
nia,1 49 the California Supreme Court, in striking down a statute re-
quiring citizenship for employment on public works, acknowledged
the contributions aliens make to the state. 150 This perspective set the
tone for the California legislature which subsequently repealed a
complex statute barring aliens from employment in state, county and
city government positions. 5' The Purdy decision also prompted the
California Attorney General to issue an opinion that citizenship bore
146. For instance, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524 mandates that an applicant for a
physician's license be a United States citizen or file a declaration of intent unless the
requirement is waived in accordance with the commissioner's regulations. Section
6525, however, provides for the issuance of a limited permit to an applicant who
fulfills all requirements except the citizenship requirement. The holder of such a
license is limited to practising under the supervision of a licensed physician and only
in public, proprietary or voluntary hospitals. The limited permit is valid for two
years and may be renewed biennially at the department's discretion. See Surmeli v.
State of New York, 412 F. Supp. 394. (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court held that the
requirement that aliens perfect their citizenship within 10 years of receiving the
temporary permit was unconstitutional, reasoning that a requirement of citizenship
as a condition of continued licensure bore no rational realtionship to continued
professional competence. Id. at 397.
147. N.Y. Civ. Panc. LAW § 9406 (McKinney 1981).
148. This is so despite the peace officer statute challenged in Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, which during the course of litigation, the legislature amended twice. 1981
Cal. Stat. 3584; 1981 Cal. Stat. 95.
149. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
150. Id. at 581-82, 456 P.2d at 656, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 88. See also Raffaelli v.
Commissioner of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1972) (invalidating statute requiring citizenship for admission to the bar).
151. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1940-45 & 1947. The statute, enacted in 1915, prohibited
hiring noncitizens for a position in any department in state, county or city govern-
ment. Through the decades a panoply of exceptions were added to the statute. These
exceptions included medical personnel under exchange programs, librarians, child
care personnel, school bus drivers and student interns. In 1968 an alien who filed a
declaration of intent to become naturalized became eligible for government employ-
ment, provided the alien was a state resident. The statute was repealed in 1970. 1970
Cal. Stat. ch. 653. See 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 473 for the statute's final form.
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no rational relationship to professional competence152 and the legisla-
ture amended numerous licensing laws to delete citizenship require-
ments.15 3
A 1974 Texas Attorney General opinion stated that a policy requir-
ing citizenship for all state employment violated the equal protection
clause.' 54 It was still permissible, however, to require citizenship or a
declaration of intent to become naturalized as a qualification for
employment in specific "appropriately defined position[s]" 55 such as
a notary public.' 56 Although the Texas legislature amended numerous
licensing statutes in 1981 to remove citizenship requirements, 15 7 the
state's system still lacks uniformity. For instance, citizenship is a
prerequisite to qualifiying as a licensed driving instructor.' 58 A pro-
gressive statutory variation on a citizenship requirement is imposed on
applicants for a certified public accountant's license. A certificate is
granted to any person who is a citizen, or to non-citizens who have
lived in Texas ninety days preceding the date of application, or who
have maintained a permanent legal residence in Texas for the six
152. 55 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 80, 81-82 (1972). The Attorney General, examining
the inconsistencies in the professional licensing laws, determined that professions fall
within the economic realm and therefore subjected the citizenship requirement to
strict scrutiny. He concluded that the state did not carry the burden of proving that
the classification constituted a necessary means of accomplishing a legitimate and
compelling state interest. He contrasted a profession to membership on the licensing
board as a political function for which the classification would be rational and
permissible. Id. at 82-83.
153. 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1285. As a result of these amendments, applicants need
not be citizens to comply with eligibility requirements for the following professional
licenses: attorneys, shorthand reporters, land surveyors, real estate brokers, optome-
trists, pharmacists, psychologists, psychiatric technicians, physical therapists, insur-
ance brokers, mineral, oil and gas brokers, social workers, vessel pilots and private
investigators. Id. Prior to this wholesale amendment, citizenship was not required of
applicants for a physician's, nurse's or dentist's license. Furthermore, the statutory
prohibition on aliens praticing law was declared unconstitutional in Raffaelli v.
Commissioner of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1972).
154. 1974 DIGEST OP. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. 24 (H-333).
155. Id.
156. 1974 DIGEST OP. TEx. ATT'y GEN. 50 (H-481). This decision was based on the
determination that a notary public is a public officer. But see Graham v. Ramani,
383 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1980) (invalidating statute requiring notaries public be citizens).
157. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (poly-
graph examiners); id. art. 4495b (3.04) (physicians); id. art. 4545 (dentists); id. art.
4542a (8) (pharmacists); id. art. 4582 (embalmers).
158. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29c) (Vernon 1976). Despite the fact
that the statute requires a chauffeur's license, forty hours of special training, two
years driving experience and a competency exam, citizenship is required of a driving
teacher.
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months immediately preceding the date of application.5 9  A series of
alternative requirements such as this demonstrates a concern for the
preservation of alien employment rights.
In the face of a rapidly growing alien population, the Florida
legislature boldly acted to eliminate employment restrictions-effec-
tively repealing all statutory restrictions upon professional and occu-
pational licensing.160 The novel statute affirmatively states that "[n]o
person shall be disqualified from practicing an occupation or profes-
sion regulated by the state solely because he is not a United States
citizen."'' The legislature intended the statute "to encourage the use
of foreign speaking Florida residents duly qualified to become actively
qualified in their professions so that all Florida citizens may receive
better services.' ' 62  The statute further provides for foreign language
exams 6 3 and directs each licensing board and commission to establish
and implement programs designed to qualify all Cuban nationals who
have been residents in Florida since 1977 for examinations.16 4
New Jersey's present statutory scheme may be the most restrictive in
the country. Formerly, a New Jersey statute granted discretion to the
examiners of numerous professions to issue a temporary provisional
license. 6 ,5 If citizenship was not perfected at the end of a six year
probationary period, the license would be revoked. 6 In 1979, how-
ever, the legislature repealed the statute effectively barring nonciti-
zens from these professions. Moreover, New Jersey statutes do not
provide that a declaration of intent to become naturalized is accept-
able in lieu of citizenship. 1 7 Instead, resident aliens are obliged to
wait until they are eligible to become naturalized before they can
pursue their professions.
One method of improving this situation has been suggested by the
legislature itself. In 1977, the citizenship requirement for an engineer
or land surveyor was replaced with a requirement that the applicant
159. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-1 (12) (1) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.10 (West 1981).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 455.11.
163. Id. § 455.11(2).
164. Id. § 455.11(3).
165. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-5 (West 1978), repealed by 1979 N.J. Laws ch. 432
§ 4. Among the professions included in the statute were physicians, certified public
accountants, dentists, veterinarians, mortuary scientists and real estate brokers.
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1 (West 1978).
167. Upon filing a declaration of intent to become naturalized a resident alien
applicant for a tree expert's license may qualify. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15C-4 (West
1978). This is the only instance where a declaration of intent is an acceptable
alternative.
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be able to read and speak the English language."," There is a legiti-
mate state interest in ensuring that licensed professionals are profi-
cient in the English language. An English proficiency test could be
used in lieu of citizenship for the remaining professions as well.
While not as restrictive as New Jersey, Illinois requires citizenship
for applicants to the civil service as well as nearly every professional or
occupational license, except physician assistants, 69 engineers 70 and
sanitarians.17 1 In addition, there are several inconsistencies among
the statutes. For example, aliens seeking a medical license are entitled
to a probationary license only. 72  Citizenship must be perfected
within five years of obtaining the license and failure to obtain citizen-
ship gives the Illinois Department of Registration and Education dis-
cretion to revoke the license. By contrast, a podiatrist's license requires
a noncitizen to petition for naturalization within thirty days of be-
coming eligible to do so.17
3
V. Recommendations
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has taken a conservative
approach to the state regulation of employment opportunities for
resident aliens, the states are free to accord aliens more than these
minimal rights. States must recognize that there are two compatible
interests involved. The first is the alien's interest in pursuing a liveli-
hood via a professional license or state employment. The second is the
168. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:8-35 (West Supp. 1981-82), amended by 1977 N.J.
Laws ch. 340 § 2.
169. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4757 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
170. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5115 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
171. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5904 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
172. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4410 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82).
173. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4901 (Smith-Hurd 1978). This same timetable
applies to applicants for a student barber's license, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 1612
(Smith-Hurd 1978). A 1974 Illinois Attorney General Opinion, 1974 Op. Ill. Att'y
Gen. 162, compared various professions to attorneys, and applied the In re Grifiths
strict scrutiny standard to declare the citizenship requirements unconstitutional be-
cause they violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 166. The Attorney General did
approve, however, of the requirements that aliens possess the necessary education,
training, experience and moral character for the job. Id. at 164. In addition, he
found that the citizenship rules conflicted with the authority of Congress to regulate
the immigration and naturalization of aliens. Id. at 166. Illinois is reevaluating all of
its professional and occupational regulations. Regulatory Agency Sunset Act of 1979,
Public Act 81-999, 1979 Ill. Laws. 3797. The decision to continue regulation will be
determined by whether the absence of regulation would harm significantly or endan-
ger the public health, safety or welfare and whether there is a resonable relationship
between the exercise of state police power and the protection of the public. Id.
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state's interest in securing qualified and dedicated employees to ensure
the smooth functioning of its political community. In most of the
Supreme Court cases discussed, the parties stipulated to the alien
candidate's educational and intellectual qualifications. 174 Similarly,
in the state statutes evaluated, the citizenship requirements are an
adjunct to competency related requirements. Thus, the citizenship
requirement deprives the state of qualified employees.
To resolve any potential conflict between legitimate state interests
and the resident alien's rights, state legislatures must establish priori-
ties. An affirmative declaration such as that made by Florida in the
area of professional licensing is one possible method. 175 The policy
could be expanded to include licensing, civil service, state and munici-
pal employment, Another means of articulating a state philosophy
would be to include alienage in a 'civil rights' statute. For instance,
"[n]o person shall be discriminated against on the basis of race, na-
tional origin, religion, sex or alienage." Such an alienage provision
also could be made subject to the political community's right to self
governance.
State legislatures should define clearly the political community.
Hawaii has attempted to do so by distinguishing levels of public
employment. The Hawaii statute176 requires that appointive 'officers'
employed by the state or municipal government in top level positions
be citizens. Other government service appointees may be permanent
resident aliens at the time of their appointment but must be natural-
ized eventually. 177 This approach is straightforward and does not
174. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 50 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982);
Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1269, 1270 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
175. See note 166 supra.
176. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 78-1 (Supp. 1981).
177. Id. The statute states in relevant part:
§78-1 Citizenship and residence of government officials and employ-
ees; exceptions. (a)AIl elective officers in the service of the government of
the State or in the service of any county or municipal subdivision of the
State shall be citizens of the United States and residents of the State for at
least three years immediately preceding assumption of office.
(b) All appointive officers in the service of the government of the State
or in the service of any county or municipal subdivision of the State who
are employed as department heads, first assistants, first deputies, second
assistants, or second deputies to a department head shall be citizens of the
United States and residents of the State for at least one year immediately
preceding their appointment; however, all others appointed in the service
of the government of the State or in the service of any county or municipal
subdivision of the State shall be citizens, nationals, or permanent resident
aliens of the United States and residents of the State at the time of their
appointment. A national or permanent resident alien appointed pursuant
to this section shall not be eligible for continued employment unless such
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delegate classification decisions to state agencies which operate away
from the public eye. A more flexible system could be designed
whereby factors such as supervision, 7 8 discretion 179 and skill'80 would
determine whether a particular public position comes within the po-
litical community. If a state carefully evaluates its objectives and
needs, the resulting arrangement should be uniform and consistent
rather than unplanned and illogical.'18
Reasonable alternatives to a citizenship requirement should be pur-
sued to protect valid state interests. An oath of allegiance to the state is
a valid means of procuring employee loyalty. Competency, however,
may be determined in several ways. An English language proficiency
requirement ensures that employees and professionals can communi-
cate adequately. In addition, interviews can serve as a means of
evaluating an applicant's familiarity with American mores and cus-
toms. Finally, standard civil service examinations could be designed so
as to test both job competence and knowledge of American laws.
VI. Conclusion
Professional licenses, as distinct from public employment opportu-
nities, should not be based upon citizenship because the purpose of
licensing is to ensure competence. Alienage has a limited relation to
professional competence.8 12 In addition, no significant or reasonable
state interest is accomplished by a citizenship requirement in licensing
laws.
person diligently seeks citizenship upon becoming eligible to apply for
United States citizenship.
(c) All employees in the service of the government of the State or in the
service of any county or municipal subdivision of the State shall be citi-
zens, nationals, or permanent resident aliens of the United States and
residents of the State at the time of their application for employment.
178. It is relevant to consider whether the employee is under immediate supervi-
sion, under general supervision or under no supervision. In addition, the necessity for
the employee to supervise others weighs upon the degree of independent judgment
required by the position.
179. Discretion may be broad, limited in accordance with established policies and
procedures, or minimal.
180. Skill encompasses education, training and experience.
181. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 50 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982).
182. It is arguable that in fields which require close human interaction, such as
medicine and psychiatry, persons unfamiliar with American culture and mores may
not be qualified adequately. There is nothing wrong with a process which screens
persons who are unfamiliar with American values and attitudes from professions
which cannot be performed without such knowledge. A broad citizenship require-
ment for eligibility to receive a professional license, however, is unnecessarily restric-
tive because it presumes all resident aliens lack a certain minimum acquaintance
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Undeniably, a state has valid interests to protect when selecting and
hiring public employees. By adhering to the principles recommended
in this Note, states can establish uniform and consistent statutory
schemes. In this way, any restriction on aliens deemed necessary by
the legislature will be legitimate and able to withstand even the
strictest judicial scrutiny. The scheme would not be so haphazard as to
belie the state's claim that a truly important political function is
served.
Joy B. Peltz
with American culture. "[T]he class of aliens is . . . a heterogeneous multitude of
persons with a wide ranging variety of ties to this country." Matthews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976). Thus a per se citizenship requirement would irrationally
exclude otherwise qualified persons from professional occupations.
